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High performance computing in US-China relations
The focus of an emerging trade dispute between the US and 
China highlights political rivalry over technology developments. 
New US and Chinese policies aim to boost national supercomputing through internal 
investment and export controls. Justifications range from national security to 
stimulating domestic industries, and are intimately related to an ongoing political and 
economic conflict between the US and China over high-tech and computing issues. 
Supercomputing has been an essential component of ‘big science’ since the 1960s, 
especially in nuclear weapons development and cryptography. Now, it is a central 
feature of ‘big data’ analytics as a commercial service.  
Sovereign Data examines this renewed attention to supercomputing and its 
implications for the sovereign interests of the world’s two superpowers. 
Recent shifts in policy 
On 29 July 2015, US President Obama issued Executive Order 13702, authorising a 
National Strategic Computing Initiative (NSCI) ‘to maximize [the national] benefits of 
high-performance computing (HPC) research, development, and deployment’.1 Key 
objectives include delivery of an ‘exascale’ HPC system two orders of magnitude 
faster than present supercomputers; increased ‘big data’ analytical capabilities; and 
improved public-private HPC collaboration across government, industry and 
academia. The aim of NSCI is to ‘sustain and enhance’ US HPC leadership, a 
heritage dating to the early Cold War and its key role in the development of nuclear 
weapons and national security cryptography.2  
Despite the illustrious history of American HPC, since 2013 the top-ranked 
supercomputer has been a Chinese government machine, Tianhe-2, at the National 
Super Computer Center, Guangzhou. Tianhe-2 is the result of government and 
academic collaboration and is twice the speed of the second-placed machine, Titan, 
operated by the US Department of Energy.3
President Obama referred to Tianhe-2 in his 2011 State of the Union address and 
its dominance directly influenced the introduction to Congress in June 2013 of the 
American Super Computing Leadership Act.4 This bill became a victim of 
Congressional lethargy but its provisions are reflected in the new NSCI. Obama’s 
executive order reflects the aims of the original Act and is intended to bypass 
legislative torpor.  
China’s HPC rivalry with the US has been described as an ‘arms race’ for at least a 
decade.5 The White House rejects such language but HPC is a key facet of an 
animated US-China dispute over the politics of high technology. In February 2015, 
the US Department of Commerce cited Tianhe-2 – and its older sibling, Tianhe-1A –
for use in ‘nuclear explosive activities’.6 The cross-departmental End-User Review 
Committee also added four technical centres associated with Tianhe-2 to its 
proscribed ‘Entity List’ for acting contrary to US national security interests.7 Building 
on this ruling, in April 2015 Commerce aborted US firm Intel’s continuing export of 
microprocessors to these HPC centres.8 
China responded by announcing export restrictions on its supercomputing hardware, 
effective as of 15 August 2015, citing unspecified national security concerns and the 
need to protect domestic high-tech industry.9 Companies manufacturing 
supercomputer components now require export licences detailing product and client 
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specifications and attract civil or criminal penalties for breaching this process. These 
policy reprisals occur against a background of diplomatic tension between the US 
and China. As Sovereign Data reported previously, this dynamic is fuelled by 
accusations of foul play and is always framed in terms of national interest and 
sovereignty.10
HPC infrastructure and investment 
The US has invested more in HPC infrastructure, and for longer, than any other 
state.11 In the 1960s, the first supercomputer clients were national laboratories in the 
US Atomic Energy Commission network, purchasing next-generation machines from 
innovators like CDC and IBM. CDC, driven by the engineering brilliance of Seymour 
Cray, cornered the government supercomputing market, while IBM dominated 
commercial data-processing. Cray prioritised computational speed over business 
compatibility, generating brute computing power compatible with the needs of 
national laboratories modelling nuclear weapons design.12 Computational power 
remains the critical factor in HPC design, although uses have diversified greatly to 
include aerodynamics, meteorology, genetics and a range of ‘big data’ analytics 
(High Performance Data Analysis) requiring massive parallel processing power to 
structure and interrogate vast data sets. Precise figures for US government HPC 
funding are hard to discern but the Department of Energy’s Advanced Scientific 
Computing Research (ASCR) program alone is seeking USD 442 billion for HPC in 
the next fiscal year.13 
The US HPC market dwarfs China’s roughly tenfold but China has invested 
significantly in HPC infrastructure since the National Computing and Networking 
Facilities of China (NCNFC) initiative of 1989 kick-started sectoral investment.14 
Sunk costs on the Tianhe-2 project are upwards of CNY 2.4 billion (USD 390 million) 
as of 2013, although, as part of China’s local government financing platform (LGFP) 
structure, most of this funding comes from the Guangzhou city government rather 
than directly from Beijing.15 State funding is also provided by the National High-Tech 
Research and Development (863) Program, which promotes innovation through 
public investment.16 This helped establish the National High Performance 
Computing Environment (NHPCE) across China, with key supercomputing nodes in 
Beijing, Shanghai and other major cities. The emphasis of NHPCE has shifted from 
technical performance to providing HPC services to nearly 3000 government, 
industrial and academic clients, mirroring the diversification in the US. Unlike the US, 
however, there is no long-term national research and development program for 
exascale computing, widely perceived as the next step in HPC technology.17
Winners and losers? 
US and Chinese HPC policies stress the importance of high performance computing 
for economic competitiveness. In the US, recent initiatives aim to consolidate and 
harmonise an extensive policy landscape and a highly diverse industrial and 
commercial environment with several decades experience of internal investment 
and export success. Challenges consist in convincing Congress to disburse the 
necessary funds and in aligning commercial and political imperatives. The Chinese 
situation has experienced recent success but the sector is relatively under-
developed despite investment in HPC and other high-tech infrastructures.  
The Chinese HPC market is somewhat constipated and there are doubts about the 
commercial prospects of even the mighty Tianhe-2. It is reportedly difficult to use 
due to anaemic software investment and high operating costs. For example, 
electricity consumption runs at up to CNY 600,000 (USD 100,000) a day.18 One 
official described it as ‘a giant with a super body but without the software to support 
its thinking soul’ and, as of June 2014, it had 120 clients utilising only 34% of its 
capacity.19 In addition to national security, its civilian applications include 
astrophysics, climate modelling, genetics, earthquake simulation and infrastructure 
design, but its operating problems may discourage Chinese and external clients 
without further significant investment. 
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There are opportunities for Chinese markets, however. The US Department of 
Commerce export ban of Intel chips may benefit China. The four HPC centres 
proscribed by the US use only mainstream Intel chips, so China can source these 
on the global market, reducing direct Chinese reliance on US firms. (Intel appears to 
have hedged against potential losses by signing a USD 200 million joint contract 
with Cray to build a new US Department of Energy supercomputer.)20 It may also 
boost domestic hardware production and deployment, including a proposed ‘China 
Accelerator’ central to a forthcoming upgrade to Tianhe-2. Domestic manufacturers 
like Inspur, already a key government partner, may also benefit from revised US 
trade policy.21 Given its importance to Chinese defence and security, Tianhe-2 will 
become even more opaque to external eyes.22  
However, the Chinese HPC export sector is far from robust. China’s export 
restrictions apply to hardware supporting processing speeds of eight teraflops a 
second or more. At present, the only Chinese machine operating at these speeds is 
Tianhe-2. What this communicates is ambiguous, as the wider HPC export sector is 
unaffected by new export restrictions. It may intend to draw potential foreign clients’ 
attention to the processing dominance of Tianhe-2 and therefore its possible 
commercial applications (notwithstanding the problems described above). It may 
also protect future sales, particularly if China finds a way of stimulating its domestic 
HPC manufacturing sector. 
Outlook 
The US and China are not the only players in the HPC sector. Japan and Europe 
also have major interests. Exascale computing is an important goal of the European 
Commission-sponsored Human Brain Project, for instance, which views exascale 
computing as equivalent to the processing power of the human brain and therefore 
essential for neural modelling.23 Japan is the fastest-growing HPC innovator and 
South Korea is now the second-ranked user of HPC in the global market.24 
Advances are also being made in India and Russia but the eye-catching story 
remains the US and China, not least as HPC connects to deeper geopolitical and 
macroeconomic rivalries. 
The economic potential of HPC is substantial but it might not matter in everyday 
terms which country has the technological edge if the real battle is for international 
bragging rights. Supercomputing has always been a blue ribbon pursuit and the 
opportunity to demonstrate technological prowess in somewhat muscular fashion is 
something few leaders could resist. The HPC ‘arms race’ is better understood as a 
key component of economic and political competition, but like the US-Soviet 
supercomputing rivalry of the Cold War its resonance extends beyond the purely 
quantitative.  
National narratives of greatness and destiny require maintenance. In the nuclear 
context, France and Britain retain nuclear weapons as symbols of status and 
prestige justified as strategically necessary ‘independent’ deterrents. This translates 
to their continued influence as members of the nuclear-only UN Security Council, 
and satisfies domestic constituencies concerned with the projection of national 
power and support for defence industry. Unlike the waning influence of the UK, 
France and (arguably) Russia in global affairs, US and particularly Chinese power is 
on the rise. High-cost national investment projects like supercomputing serve to 
elevate global status rather than arrest its decline. 
Observers of global HPC trends are well-served by independent monitors like the 
Top 500 index that provide open-source reporting and analysis. Both the US and 
China are also relatively prepared to announce policy changes in open forum. 
Although the channels appear to be open, the potential severing of links between 
US and Chinese developers and manufacturers would likely lead to reduced 
transparency and visibility. The irony is that as the US and China pursue mutual 
exclusion they may be damaging their own prospects for winning the HPC clients 
they openly seek. As each other’s largest trading partner, the real challenge will 
involve the US and China striking a competitive balance between the prestige of 
high technology leadership and the benefits of economic cooperation. 
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